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Copenhaver: Bankruptcy--Rights and Powers in Chapter XIII

Bankruptcy-Rights and Powers in
Chapter XIII*
JoHN

T. CoP

AvEI,

Jn.**

An understanding of the rights and powers of the various parties
involved in a Chapter XIII proceeding is not easily had. The statutory language is somewhat windblown, sometimes confused and
frequently ambiguous. Reported decisions in Chapter XIII cases
are few. However, Chapter XI, dealing with arrangements, and
Chapter XIII, dealing with wage earner plans, contain many identical or quite similar provisions, so that an interpretation of one of
the chapters often has significance as authority for a like position
under the other chapter. Where such is the case, reference will be
made to cases decided under or a treatise on Chapter XI.
In order to eliminate undue detail, this analysis will be confined
to proceedings arising under section 622, except where noted otherwise' A section 622 proceeding is one initiated by the debtor who
files an original petition under Chapter XIII at a time when no
bankruptcy proceeding is pending by or against him. Of course,
section 622 proceedings comprise nearly all of the Chapter XIII
cases filed.
From the outset it is helpful to keep in mind two basic principles
of Chapter XIII. First, a Chapter XIII proceeding is voluntary with
the debtor from beginning to end.' Second, Chapter XIII envisions
payment by the debtor of his creditors primarily out of future
earnings.'
Of fundamental importance is section 602. There it is stipulated
that the provisions of Chapters I to VII (the ordinary bankruptcy
* This article is a slightly revised version of an address given by the
author at the Referees' Regional Seminar at Cleveland, Ohio, February 25, 1966.
** Referee in Bankruptcy of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia.
' Bankruptcy Act ch. 13, 52 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (1964),
will be cited throughout this article as "Chapter XIII." The subdivisions of
Chapter XIII will be cited only to the section numbers of volume 52 of the
United States Statutes at Large pp. 930-938. Section 621 provides for the filing
by the debtor of a Chapter XIII petition in a pending bankruptcy proceeding.
2 See Rice v. Minims, 291 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961); In re Hendern, 240
F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Ohio 1965); 10 CoLnmu,
BAmmKumTCY fr 24.04 (14th ed.
1963).
§ § 623, 646(4); 10 Cor.mn=, sun, Anote
2, IT24.06(5).
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sections 1 to 72) shall apply to Chapter XIII proceedings insofar
as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of
Chapter XIII, and that, for the purposes of such application in a
section 622 proceeding, the date of the petition in bankruptcy and
the date of adjudication shall be taken to be the date of the filing
of an original petition under section 622.
The general incorporating provisions of section 602 are supplemented in Chapter XIII by other incorporating provisions of a more
specific nature. These further provisions declare that, where not
inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter XIII, certain rights,
powers and duties shall be the same in a section 622 proceeding as if
a voluntary petition for adjudication in bankruptcy had been filed
and a decree of adjudication had been entered at the time the
section 622 petition was filed. Thus, it is provided that the jurisdiction, powers and duties of the court shall be the same (section 612);
the powers and duties of the officers of the court and the rights,
privileges, and duties of the debtor shall be the same (section 636);
and the rights, duties, and liabilities of creditors and of all other
persons with respect to the property of the debtor shall be the same
(section 641).

THmRiGHTs

AN

PowEas OF A CHAPTER XIII TRusTEE

Section 633(4) states that at the first meeting of creditors the
court shall, if the debtor's plan is accepted, "appoint a trustee to
receive and distribute, subject to the control of the court, all moneys
to be paid under the plan .... " Chapter XIII makes no further
specific reference to the Chapter XIII trustee as such except for the
perfunctory matters of the trustee's bond,' the trustee's costs and
commissions5 and the discharge of the trustee.' Bearing in mind
that the underlying purpose of Chapter XIII is to rehabilitate the
debtor out of future earnings rather than to liquidate and distribute
his present assets, section 633(4) serves to point up two essential
differences between the rights and powers of a Chapter XIII trustee
and those of an ordinary bankruptcy trustee. First, the Chapter
XIII trustee does not take title to the debtor's property as does an

633(4).
51 659(2), (3).

4§
6

662.
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ordinary bankruptcy trustee under section 70a.' Second, the Chapter XIII trustee administers out of the future earnings of the debtor,
whereas the ordinary bankruptcy trustee generally has no right to
any property acquired by a bankrupt after his petition in bankruptcy
has been filed.'
In further connection with the question of title, the congressional
intent may be found by contrasting section 633(4) of Chapter XIII
with corresponding provisions in Chapters X, XI and XII. All four
chapters were enacted simultaneously in 1938. Yet, Congress expressly provided that the trustee under Chapter X (section 187)
and Chapter XII (section 442) shall be vested with the same rights
and powers as an ordinary bankruptcy trustee would hold and that
under Chapter XI (section 342), where no receiver or trustee is
appointed, the debtor in possession9 shall be vested with all the title
and powers of an ordinary bankruptcy trustee.
Nevertheless, the Chapter XIII trustee does take on some of the
rights and powers of an ordinary bankruptcy trustee. ' ° The provisions of section 636 just noted specify that, unless inconsistent with
Chapter XII, the powers and duties of the officers of the court shall
be the same in Chapter XIII as if a petition in ordinary bankruptcy
had been filed. The "trustee" is an "officer" of the court under
section 1(22). As already indicated, it is clear enough that it would
be inconsistent with the provisions and the underlying purpose of
Chapter XIII to conclude that title to the debtor's assets falls by
operation of law to the Chapter XIII trustee. But it is not inconsistent with either the provisions of Chapter XIII or its underlying
purpose to hold that the Chapter XIII trustee possesses the rights
of an ordinary bankruptcy trustee under section 70c." In fact, to
78 COLLmR, BA KuTcu

Y

'f 6.31, p. 957 n.1 (14th ed. 1963). Cf. United

States v. Belkin, 358 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966), wherein it is held that the filing
of a Chapter XHII petition by an insolvent debtor is sufficient to invoke the
priority of the United States as a voluntary assignment under 31 U.S.C. 191,
the priority provision of which is in turn embodied in the Bankruptcy Act as
the fifth priority under Section 64a(5); however, the court does not hold that
the Chapter XIII trustee takes title, but merely declares that the possession
and control of the debtor's property passes to the court to the same extent as
in a Chapter XI proceeding. Thus, the Sixth Circuit seems to conclude that
the passing of possession and control of one's property is alone sufficient to
constitute a voluntary assignment within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 191.
8 § 70a; 10 CoLLmR, supra note 2, ff25.10, 26.01.
9
A "debtor in possession" is an officer of the court, an entity separate and
distinct from the debtor. Chapter XIII makes no provision for a debtor in
possession, although the debtor does remain in possession of his assets.
10 City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956), 56
A.L.R.2d 749, note at 755; 10 CoLixER, supra note 2, ff 26.01, at p. 215.
11

Ibid.
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conclude otherwise would be contrary to the express provisions
of section 641 which prescribes that "the rights, duties and liabilities
of creditors and of all other persons with respect to the property of
the debtor," shall be the same as would be the case in an ordinary
bankruptcy proceeding. 2
Consequently, the claims of those contending to be secured
creditors must meet the test of sections 60, 67 and 70e, as well as
70c. The result is that the claims of creditors are fixed as secured
or unsecured in keeping with established bankruptcy principles and
procedures. And where the party contending to be a secured
creditor declines to file a claim, the trustee may invoke the court's
broad jurisdiction over the property of the debtor so as to stay the
hand of a creditor whose position is infirm by reason of sections
60, 67, 70c or 70e. 3 This is not to say that the Chapter XIII trustee
is also empowered with the right to recover preferences and avoid
fraudulent conveyances, except insofar as such recovery or avoidance results incidentally through the trustee's use of section 57g
against a claim filed by a creditor. 4 Absent the Section 57g situation, the recovery of preferences and the avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances are beyond the scope of a Chapter XIII proceeding.
At the same time, while a proceeding under Chapter XIII is
pending, the running of all periods of time prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act are suspended in respect to the recovery and avoidance
of any such preference or transfer and in respect to the commission of an act of bankruptcy (section 676). Accordingly, rights
arising in connection therewith are not lost.

THE. PLAN, SECURED AND UNSECURED CRITORS,
ACCEPTANCE, MODIFICATION AND CONFIRMATION

A wage earner plan is defined by section 606(7) as being "a plan
for a composition or extension, or both." Section 646 sets forth the
mandatory and permissive features of the plan and directs, among
other things, that a plan "(1) shall include provisions dealing with
unsecured debts generally, upon any terms;" and "(2) may include
provisions dealing with secured debts severally, upon any terms."
In order to be confirmed, a plan must first be accepted. A plan
is deemed accepted under section 651 when it has been accepted in
12
13

City Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, supra note 10.
§ § 611, 612, 614, 658.

14Be § 57g, see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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writing by all creditors affected thereby, whether or not their claims
have been proved. But where the plan is not accepted by all creditors affected thereby, section 652 provides that a plan shall be
deemed accepted when (1) accepted in writing by a majority in
number and amount of the unsecured creditors whose claims have
been proved and allowed before the conclusion of the first meeting
or any adjournment thereof, and (2) accepted in writing by the
secured creditors whose claims are dealt with by the plan, whether
or not any such creditor has also filed his claim therein. 5
When is a creditor "affected" by a plan? As set forth in section
607, "A creditor shall be deemed to be 'affected' by a plan only if
his interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby." The
entire class of unsecured creditors is always affected by the terms
of a wage earner plan because provision must be made for them
therein. Likewise, each secured creditor who is provided for in the
plan is affected thereby and is "dealt with" therein. As a result,
the plan cannot be confirmed unless each secured creditor provided
for in the plan accepts the plan.' 6
On the other hand, any secured creditor who is not provided for
in the plan is not to be deemed "dealt with" by such plan. Unfortunately, the lone reported court decision considering this specific
question has concluded to the contrary, albeit erroneously. In the
case of In re O'Dell," the plan provided for all unsecured creditors
but only for those secured creditors who accepted the plan. One
of the secured creditors rejected the plan and then proceeded to
object to confirmation. Although the issue is not stated in the
opinion with the precision one would desire, it is plain enough that
the court considered the plan to be one which, because of the
rejection, did not include the rejecting secured creditor; otherwise,
the plan could not possibly have been confirmed in the face of a
rejection by a secured creditor within the plan, and the court would
have had no occasion to consider the matter further. The court held
that a secured creditor, even though not provided for in the plan,
is "dealt vith" by the plan simply because (1) section 611 confers
upon the court jurisdiction of the debtor's property, (2) the debtor's
property has passed into the custody of the court by virtue of the
5

Interstate Fin. Corp. v. Scrogham, 265 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1959).
6Inre
Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
17In re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
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debtor's possession and (3) section 614 authorizes the court upon
cause shown to stay until final decree any act or action to enforce
a lien. 8
The effect of the O'Dell decision would require that every secured
creditor must accept the plan, even though not provided for therein;
that is, the plan could not be confirmed over the supposed veto
power of a secured creditor who is wholly outside the plan. One
need look no further than section 646, which prescribes the provisions of a wage earner plan, to ascertain that the O'Dell decision
is a misconception: section 646 provides that a plan shall include
provisions dealing with unsecured debts generally and may include
provisions dealing with secured debts severally. The words "shall"
and "may" are used throughout Chapter XIII in a most discriminating fashion, carefully designed to distinguish between the mandatory and the permissive. Consequently, although the debtor must
deal with all of his unsecured creditors generally, it is quite plain
that he may in his plan choose to deal with some or all or none of
his secured creditors, except that claims secured by real estate must
in any event be excluded from the plan. 9 Accordingly, a secured
creditor's failure to accept a plan from which he is excluded is not
a bar to confirmation.
But even where a secured creditor within the plan declines to
accept the plan, it is often a simple matter for the plan to be modified so as to exclude such creditor therefrom, thereby permitting
the plan to be deemed accepted and paving the way for confirmation." Section 653 authorizes the court to permit the debtor to
propose written alterations or modifications of the plan prior to confirmation, such as one to exclude from the plan a non-assenting
secured creditor. If the court finds under section 654 that the
proposed modification does not materially and adversely affect the
interest of any creditor, the manifest implication of section 654 is
that such modification may be adopted by the court ex parte and
the plan deemed amended accordingly without the necessity of
procuring acceptances anew. That is, the acceptance of the original
I8

The court's reasoning misses the mark: the question is not whether a

secured creditor might for some purposes be subjected to the jurisdiction or
injunctive decree of the court during the course of the proceeding, but rather,
whether the secured creditor is dealt with by the plan.
19 Section 606(1) provides that, for the purposes of Chapter

XIII,

'claims' . . . shall not include claims secured by estates in real property or

chattels real.. ."; 10 CoLLmR, supra note 2, ff 28.03.
20 10 Co.Lrnm, supranote 2, ff 29.02 n.24.
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plan will be treated as acceptance of the amended plan. In addition,
sections 654 and 655 prescribe the mechanics whereby, prior to
confirmation, a modification which does materially and adversely
affect the interest of any creditor who has not agreed to such modification can be brought on for hearing. No provision is made in
Chapter XIII for amendment after confirmation.'
On the other hand, some plans avoid the necessity of amending so
as to eliminate a non-assenting secured creditor who is within the
plan. This is sometimes accomplished by providing in the plan that
all such secured creditors who fail to accept the plan by the conclusion of the first meeting are to be deemed not provided for
under, and not dealt with by, such plan. This may also be accomplished by the more sweeping method of providing in the plan that
the debtor's executory contracts with all secured creditors who fail
to accept the plan by the conclusion of the first meeting are automatically deemed rejected under the terms of the plan. Rejection,
of course, is a two-edged sword that will frequently result in foreclosure by the secured creditor on his security.22
For the purpose of classifying a creditor as secured or unsecured,
it is important to bear in mind that the following creditors are
deemed unsecured, whether in ordinary bankruptcy or Chapter
XIII, even though they may think of themselves as secured creditors: (1) a creditor whose lien or security is invalid as against the
trustee under sections 60, 67, 70c or 70e; 2" (2) a creditor whose
security is composed of property owned by one other than the
debtor; 4 and (3) any creditor to the extent that security held by
him is of a value less than his lien debt. 5
A fourth instance in which an otherwise secured creditor may be
regarded as unsecured for dividend purposes in ordinary bankruptcy
proceedings arises in connection with exempt property which is
nevertheless subject to a valid lien in favor of a creditor. In bankruptcy proceedings generally, such a creditor is unsecured, according not only to the weight of authority 2 but also to the definite
21
22

22.06.2 3

10 CoLmR, supra note 2, f[ 29.03.
8 CoLrmam, supra note 7, ff 3.15(7); and 10 CoLLim, supra note 2, [

Ibid.; note 10, supra.
1(28).

24 §
25

26

10 CoL.

, supra note 2,

REINcTON,

BA,,xrupTcy

If 22.10 n.l0.
§ 910 (Henderson ed. 1956).
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trend of the more recent cases." This is so even though the creditor
may in any event look to his security. The majority view accords
with section 1(28) which provides that the term "'Secured creditor'
shall include a creditor who has security for his debt upon the
property of a bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under this Act
.. ";and it likewise accords with the case of Lockwood v. Exchange
Bank,2" holding that title to the exempt property of the debtor does
not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy. Inasmuch as title to exempt
property is not "assignable under the Act" to the trustee, a creditor
holding a lien thereon is deemed unsecured under the majority rule.
In Chapter XIII, however, it would appear that a creditor holding a lien on property of the debtor is secured whether such property be exempt or non-exempt. Under Chapter XIII, none of the
debtor's property is assignable by operation of law to the Chapter
XIII trustee. The Chapter XIII trustee does not take title to the
property of the debtor29 except in certain unusual circumstances
wherein the plan or the order confirming the plan so provides."
Thus, if section 1(28) as above quoted is applicable in Chapter
XIII, secured creditors in Chapter XIII would become virtually
extinct. This, of course, is completely at odds with provisions
throughout Chapter XIII which make a clear distinction between
secured and unsecured creditors. Inasmuch as section 1(28) as
quoted above is in plain conflict with Chapter XIII, it is not applicable"1 insofar as it would treat as unsecured those creditors who
hold liens on property of the debtor, such property not being assignable under Chapter XIII. Consequently, the term "secured creditor"
is entitled to its meaning in normal parlance insofar as property of
the debtor is concerned. Moreover, such an interpretation serves
to eliminate the anomalous situation that would result where the
creditor holding a lien on exempt property is treated as unsecured
for purposes of the plan, but remains secured wholly outside the
1
27

n re Guilliot, 47 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. La. 1942) (Chapter XI); Robinson v. Exchange Nat1 Bank, 28 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Okda. 1939); In re Anderson, 11 F.2d 380 (D. Minn. 1926); see Feder v. John Engeihomn & Sons, 202

F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1953) (dictum). Some of the older cases adopt a contrary

view, but several of them, such as Fenley v. Poor, 121 Fed. 739 (6th Cir.
1903), have been undercut, though not directly repudiated, by the holding
in Lockwood v. Exchange Nat'1 Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903); see other cases
collected in 1 CoLLR=, BA xwrprcY If 1.28, p. 130.8 n. 14 (14th ed.).
21 Supra note 27.
29 See text, supra beginning after note 6; and see supra note 7.
30 § 70i; see text, infra beginning at note 49.
31

§ 602.
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scope of the plan, entitled to foreclose unless his full contract payments are met. 2
J iusDICriON OVER TBE PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR

The summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over the property of the debtor is enlarged under Chapter XIII.33 First, section
612 provides that the jurisdiction, powers and duties of the court
shall be the same as if an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding had been
commenced. This serves to confer upon the court the ordinary
bankruptcy summary jurisdiction based on possession in the debtor
34
at the time of bankruptcy.
Second, section 611 provides that, where not inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, the court shall "have exclusive jurisdiction
of the debtor and his property, wherever located, and of his earnings and wages during the period of consummation of the plan."
And, apparently, to make clear that the court's jurisdiction continues
throughout the Chapter XIII proceeding, section 658 provides that,
during the period of extension, the court "shall retain jurisdiction
of the debtor and his property for all purposes of the plan and its
consummation...." This section serves to extend the summary
jurisdiction of the court to all property owned" by the debtor, even
though not in his possession.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the court's process may generally transcend state lines.36 This means that, even where the court
is dealing with property owned by the debtor which is located outside its territorial limits and is not in its actual possession, the court
may send its process beyond those territorial limits. As a consequence, ancillary proceedings over such property in Chapter XIII
are eliminated.
Furthermore, jurisdiction over the debtor's property is not limited
by reason of any lien held thereon by a creditor who refuses to
accept the debtor's plan, nor is such jurisdiction limited by reason
of the fact that such property is real estate subject to a lien in
favor of one whose claim cannot be dealt with under a wage earner
38
plan.

32

See text, infra at note 41.
CoMRm, supranote 7, ff 3.01(1).

33 8

34

35
36

Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931).
8 Co~i , supranote 7, If3.02.

8 CoLI.IEI, supra note 7, ff 3.03(1), (2).
37
38 8 COL=IE, supra note 7, g 3.04(1).

Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
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INJUNCMION AND THE SECURED CREDITOR

Section 614 of the act provides as follows:
The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section
11 of this Act and elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay
until final decree the commencement or continuation of suits
other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of a debtor,
and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until
final decree any act or the commencement or continuation of
any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a
debtor.
This section empowers the court to enjoin or stay without notice
suits other than those to enforce liens upon the property of the
debtor. As to suits to enforce liens upon the property of a debtor
and as to any act by a secured creditor to enforce a lien upon the
property of a debtor, this section provides that the court may, "upon
notice and for cause shown," enjoin or stay the same. The "property" of the debtor referred to in section 614 embraces property
of whatever character. And so it is that even though a claim secured
by lien upon the debtor's real estate cannot be dealt with in a wage
earner plan, the holder of such claim is subject to injunction under
section 614."
Nevertheless, an injunction to stay a secured creditor who is not
dealt with by the plan, either because the claim is secured by real
estate or because such secured creditor is not provided for under
the plan, cannot issue under section 614 except upon notice and for
cause shown. It is perfectly plain that section 614 requires that
notice be given of the application for an injunction to stay the enforcement of a lien before the injunction thereunder is granted.
Inasmuch as such an injunction under section 614 is to issue only
upon notice and for cause shown,4" it is likewise perfectly plain
that the secured creditor sought to be enjoined is entitled to be
heard thereon.
Where the purpose of the injunction is to stay a secured creditor
who is not dealt with by the plan, whether for the duration of the
plan or for any extended period of time, a section 614 injunction
can issue only after the court, under the rule of the Hallenbeck
39
Ibid.;
In re Garrett,
2037,F.ff Supp.
459 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
408
CoLImR,
supranote
3.22(3).
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case,4" has first found the following: (1) the injunction or stay is
necessary to preserve the debtor's estate or to carry out the Chapter
XIII plan; (2) the granting of the injunction will not directly or
indirectly impair the security of the lien; (3) the owner of the
secured indebtedness will not be required to accept less than the
full periodic payments specified in his contract; and (4) in addition
to usual equitable considerations, the debtor's submission of his plan
is in good faith and the plan is feasible.
Additionally, section 614 may doubtless be invoked to enjoin a
secured creditor, who is not dealt with by the plan, for a limited
period of time in order to permit the court sufficient time in which
to adjudicate controversies respecting the creditor's lien on property
of the debtor.
However, this does not mean that an injunctive decree staying the
enforcement of a lien on property of a debtor cannot, under appropriate circumstances, be entered without notice under other authority possessed by the court. There will always be circumstances
under which the court, acting under the broad powers of section
2a(15), will properly exercise its jurisdiction to stay a secured
creditor for a brief period of time, as, for example, where a temporary restraining order is required in order to maintain the status quo
pending a hearing and determination of the right to a section 614
injunction. 2
Tm PARTIALY-SEcURED C E rrr; AND THE SUBORDINATE
LIEN CREDITOR WHosE LaN Is IN FACr VALuELxss

The Hallenbeck43 case lays down the conditions that must be met

in order to stay the hand of a protesting secured creditor. Foremost
among these is the requirement that the debtor must meet the full
periodic contract payments.4 4 Although the circuit court in Hallenbeck did not so state, it appears from the earlier district court
opinion that the court was there dealing with a creditor who was
wholly secured by an asset worth more than the lien debt.45 What
41 Supra note 38. See also In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960);
In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1940); In re Garrett, supra note 39.
42 8 CoTr.,n, supra note 7, ff 3.22(2). Section 2a(15) invests the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction to: "Make such orders, issue such process, and
enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however,
That an injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only.
43 Supra note 38; see also cases cited supra note 41.
4 Ibid.
45 In re Hallenbeck, 209 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Va. 1962).
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of the other extreme, where a so-called secured creditor is a subordinate lien creditor who holds a second lien on assets worth no
more than the first lien thereon? It is apparent that such a creditor
is in fact not secured at all. Where such a creditor declines to file
his claim as an unsecured creditor in an amount limited to the
unpaid principal balance of his debt with interest only to the date
of filing, the debtor should move quickly to reject the executory
contract giving rise to the "lien." Such rejection by the debtor will
be made under section 613(1), unless the plan itself provides for
rejection under section 646(1), in which latter case confirmation of
the plan will bring about rejection. After hearing upon notice to the
rejectee, the court, if it finds the value of the asset to be less than
sufficient to cover the prior lien thereon, will not only fix the damages in the principal amount of the debt with interest to the date of
filing, but the court may also enjoin the creditor from further efforts
of any kind to enforce its security agreement against such asset.
Where, as in this situation, the subordinate lien creditor holds a
lien which has nothing more than a mere nuisance value arising out
of its possible use to harrass and obstruct the rehabilitative process,
the court must be deemed empowered to enjoin under either section
2a(15) or section 614. The debt, having been fixed as an unsecured
claim, is payable only under the plan along with the other common
creditors.
It is well to note at this point that the court in Chapter XIII is
frequently called upon to determine the fair value of a debtor's
property in order to segregate the secured indebtedness from the
unsecured, including the splitting of a single debt which is only
partially secured. Such findings are prerequisites to determinations
of such matters as: (1) whether the debtor proposes to treat an
unsecured debt, including the unsecured portion of a partiallysecured debt, on any basis other than the pro rata treatment required by section 646(1); (2) whether the plan has been duly
accepted; (3) whether a particular debt is provided for under the
plan so as to be dischargeable under sections 660 or 661; (4) whether the debtor holds an equity or interest which ought to be preserved in a given article or piece of property, in instances where
such a finding is material to the issuance of an injunction under the
rule of the Hallenbeck case; (5) whether a subordinate lien creditor
is in reality unsecured, in instances where such a finding is necessary
to the issuance of an injunction staying foreclosure under such a
lien; and (6) whether, in view of the foregoing determinations, the
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payments to be made both under and outside the plan are such that
the court may confirm the plan as being feasible. These findings of
value are made as a natural and necessary incident to the exercise
of the jurisdiction, powers and duties of the bankruptcy courts in
Chapter XIII proceedings. Thus, the basis for such determinations
is separate and distinct from the provisions of section 57h which, in
ordinary bankruptcy, come into play only where a proof of claim
is filed.46 Authority for the enforcement and effectuation of such
determinations is to be found, where no specific grant of power is
apparent, in the broad powers of section 2a(15).
This leads to a consideration of perhaps the most perplexing of all
problems in Chapter XU1-what is the treatment to be accorded
the protesting partially-secured creditor? Suppose a creditor holds
a valid lien securing indebtedness that runs twice the value of the
property serving as security. Such creditor holds a secured debt
as to half his claim and an unsecured debt as to the other half.
Assuming that the property is of such a nature as to be reasonably
necessary to the debtor's rehabilitation under Chapter XIII, the
debtor may wish to seek the protection of the court in the hope of
retaining this property. If the creditor will not agree to split his
claim into secured and unsecured segments, can the debtor retain
the property by complying with the rule of the Hallenbeclc case?
No, for that rule relates to a creditor as to whom the debtor must
make the full periodic contract payments, whereas a debtor is not
to be permitted to make the full periodic contract payments on a
partially-secured debt. Obviously, where the contract payments are
being applied to a debt which is only partially secured, such serves
to treat severally not only the secured part but also the unsecured
part; and this is plainly prohibited by section 646(1) which requires
that all unsecured debts be treated alike. Moreover, the full contract
interest which ordinarily is
payments will likely include post-filing
47
not allowable on unsecured claims.
It can be forcefully argued that the court should evaluate the
security and then permit the contract payments to be made to the
extent of the value of the security (plus interest for the delay in
payment of such value), with the balance of the claim allowable as
unsecured. However, the cases indicate as a general proposition
that the creditor is entitled to demand that he receive either his
CoLaxa, BAMMUPTCYgI157.20(3) (14th ed. 1961).
§ 63a(1); see 3 CoLLn, supra note 46, i 63.16(1).

463

47
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contract payments or his security."8 Presumably, this means all, not
merely some, of his contract payments.
So, where security worth less than the lien debt does have some
value, as distinguished from no value or mere nominal or nuisance
value, section 641 would seem to require that the creditor be permitted to foreclose his security. As already pointed out, section 641
provides that the rights, as well as the duties, of the creditors and
all other persons with respect to the property of the debtor shall be
the same as in ordinary bankruptcy unless inconsistent with the
provisions of Chapter XIII. Inasmuch as the debtor cannot be
authorized to make all of the contract payments on a partiallysecured debt, the creditor should be accorded the ordinary bankruptcy right to foreclose and realize as best he can on his security in
accordance with the terms of his security agreement.
RiGHrs OF Tm DFBTOR AS TO

His

PROPERTY

It has been noted that the Chapter XIII trustee does not automatically take title to the debtor's property. In a section 622 case,
title remains vested in the debtor throughout the pendency of the
Chapter XIII proceeding unless, prior to confirmation of a plan,
the debtor is adjudicated a bankrupt, or unless, upon confirmation,
either the plan as confirmed or the order of confirmation directs
under section 70i that title shall be vested in another party.4"
If the debtor in a section 622 proceeding is adjudicated a bankrupt prior to confirmation, it is provided in section 667 that the
ordinary bankruptcy trustee takes title to all of the debtor's property as of the date of the filing of the section 622 petition. Inasmuch
as disposition by the debtor of his property in a section 622 proceeding might be undone by an ordinary bankruptcy trustee if
confirmation should be refused and the case converted to ordinary
bankruptcy, and inasmuch as the status quo during the period from
the date of filing to the date of confirmation should be maintained
by the debtor and all others by virtue of sections 636 and 641, it is
41 See also In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962); Hallenbeck v.

Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra note 38; In re Clevenger, supra note 41; In re
Garrett, supra note 39; In re Pappas, supra note 16; In re Duncan, supra note
41.
49 § 70i provides: "Upon the confirmation of an arrangement or plan, or
at such later time as may be provided by the arrangement or plan, or in the
order confirming the arrangement or plan, the title to the property dealt with
shall revest in the bankrupt or debtor, or vest in such other person as may
be provided by the arrangement or plan or in the order confirming the arrangement or plan.
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the duty of the debtor to see that the estate is preserved while the
proceeding is pending action on confirmation.
But if the plan fails after confirmation and the section 622 case is
converted by the debtor into an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding,
the ordinary bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to the terms of section
669(1) is only "vested with the title to all property of the debtor
as of the date of the entry of the order directing that bankruptcy be
proceeded with." So it is plain that, once a plan is confirmed, the
debtor's title as of the date of filing a section 622 proceeding is no
longer subject to divestment in favor of an ordinary bankruptcy
trustee by relation back to the original filing date. As a result, the
debtor after confirmation is at liberty to dispose of his property,
whether by sale or by encumbrance, unless the plan or the order
confirming the plan provides otherwise or unless the debtor has, for
proper reason, been enjoined by the court."' Of course, neither
the court nor the trustee is in a position to police the myriad of
transactions in which the debtor will engage during the existence
of the plan. As a protective measure in the event bankruptcy be
ordered after confirmation, section 669(3) serves to apply sections
60, 67 and 70 to the debtor's transactions in the same manner as if an
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding had been commenced on the date
of entry of the order directing that bankruptcy be proceeded with.
If the debtor holds a substantial equity in a given asset or if the
debtor owns property of substantial value which is encumbered by
a lien invalid as against the trustee, then the court may well want to
make certain that such property is protected from dissipation by the
debtor during the course of the proceeding."1 In such a case, it
would seem appropriate for the court to suggest to the debtor that,
prior to confirmation, he propose a written modification of his plan
under which he agrees that he will retain such property or that such
property shall be deemed to vest under section 70i in the Chapter
XIII trustee for designated purposes of the plan or pending successful completion of the plan. Even though Chapter XIII contemplates
payment by the debtor primarily out of his future wages and earnings, this does not mean that property of the debtor is excluded
from use in meeting the claims of the creditors. Not only may the
plan provide that such property be utilized to supplement payments
out of future earnings, but Chapter XIII should be deemed suffiso Seedman v. Friedman, 132 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1942) (Chapter XI).

5, See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, supra note. 10.
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ciently flexible to permit in a proper case payment of a major portion
of one's debts out of the debtor's property where the plan so provides. In this connection, section 646(7) specifically provides that a
plan under Chapter XIII "may include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this chapter." Should the debtor decline
to amend so as to comply with the court's suggestion, then, assuming
section 656 applies, it may be appropriate for the court to find that
the plan is not "for the best interests of the creditors" and refuse
confirmation.
On the other hand, if the existence of such an asset should not
come to the court's attention until after the plan has been confirmed,
it would seem to be within the court's jurisdiction to enjoin the
debtor under section 2a(15) from disposing of such asset. Even
though such property would not be devoted to the payment of the
claims of creditors in the course of the Chapter XIII proceeding,
such property would at least be available to the creditors in the
event such proceeding should ultimately be converted to bankruptcy; or, absent ordinary bankruptcy, such property would remain
available for the claims of creditors in non-bankruptcy forums upon
subsequent dismissal of the Chapter XIII proceeding. For obvious
reasons, the vesting of title to such an asset in the Chapter XIII
trustee pending consummation of the plan is a far safer course than
merely enjoining the debtor.
FomRcLosUrn

AND CONSENT OF THE COURT

Section 641 provides that, "Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the rights, duties, and liabilities of creditors
and of all other persons with respect to the property of the debtor
shall be the same . . ." in a Chapter XIII proceeding as if an

ordinary bankruptcy proceeding had been filed. In ordinary bankruptcy it is incumbent upon a lien creditor to obtain permission of
the court to foreclose upon property which has passed into the
possession and custody of the court, even though no stay order has
been entered.5 2 In the absence of such permission, the foreclosure
sale will be treated either as utterly void53 or, according to the more
moderate view and seeming trend of the cases, as voidable in the
52

RuPTciY

s'

Issacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., supra note 34; 1

COLLu,
BANK2.62(1), (2), (3) (14th ed. 1962).
Cohen v. Nixon, 236 Fed. 407 (S. D. Ga. 1916); In re Hasie, 206 Fed.

i

789 (N. D. Texas 1913); In re Brooks, 91 Fed. 508 (D. Vt. 1898).
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discretion of the court.5 4 Thus, section 641 would seem to require
that "creditors and... all other persons," whether holding liens on
real estate or personalty, must obtain the permission of the Chapter
XIII court to foreclose just as in ordinary bankruptcy.
Certainly this must be the rule prior to confirmation." During
the relatively brief period generally required for action on confirmation of a wage earner plan, it is imperative that the status quo remain
intact except as the court may specifically authorize and direct.
During this period, time is required in order that the debtor might
formulate and file his plan, that the creditors might consider the
plan and accept or reject and that the court might pass upon the
plan and its acceptance and determine whether confirmation should
be ordered. To permit these matters to be considered in a calm and
deliberate atmosphere, without undue haste or harrassment, and
with the debtor's rehabilitation as the goal, it is essential that creditors be deemed precluded from taking action which might jeopardize the entire plan without first gaining the court's consent.
Moreover, if the plan is not confirmed, it may be that the proceeding
will be immediately converted into an ordinary bankruptcy case, in
which event the encumbered property will be available for administration.
After confirmation, an accepting secured creditor who is provided
for in the plan is not free to foreclose without the prior approval of
the court. Even where the debtor defaults in his payments under the
plan, resulting in failure to meet the installments due under the plan
to such an accepting secured creditor, the court cannot authorize
foreclosure unless the plan contains a special escape provision,
under section 646(7), permitting such action. Absent such a provision, the release of the secured creditor from the plan would constitute a post-confirmation modification of the plan-and Chapter
XIII makes no provision for modification after confirmation. 6 Thus,
the only remedy open to a secured creditor in such a situation is to
seek dismissal of the proceeding under section 666.
'4Hardt v. Kirkpatrick, 91 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 626 (1938); Heffron v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 84 F.2d 301 (9th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 597 (1936). Additional cases are collected
in 1 CorTma, supra note 52, 112.62 nn. 10, 11, 21 and in Annot., 112 A.L.R.
508 (1938); 5A REmNGToN, BAN RuTcY § § 2522.30, 2522.31 (Henderson

ed. 1953).
55

Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (2d Cir.
1940) (Chapter XI); but see In re Potts, 47 F. Supp. 990 (E. D. Ky. 1942)
(Chapter XI) (dictum).
5610 ColrER, supranote 2, ff 29.03.
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But whether, after confirmation, a secured creditor not provided
for in the plan must obtain the prior permission of the court to foreclose, either as to realty or personalty, is open to some question.
Authoritative decisional law on this point is lacking. It is true that
confirmation of the plan has set the proceeding on an established
course and that the debtor has had ample time to work out arrangements with those secured creditors who are to be handled outside
the plan. It is likewise true that the debtor and other interested
parties have had sufficient time to make use of the injunctive remedies available under section 614. Nevertheless, a potential deficiency claim or the loss of a substantial equity or a determination
as to the validity of a supposed lien can be as important to the body
of creditors in a Chapter XIII proceeding as in ordinary bankruptcy.
Consequently, it would appear rather clear that, even after confirmation, section 641 imposes upon the secured creditor, unaffected by
the plan though he be, the same duty to seek permission to foreclose
as in ordinary bankruptcy. The secured creditor who fails to obtain
such consent may well find at some future date that he is being
called upon to meet the demands of the trustee or other interested
parties either to restore the status quo or to recompense the estate
for losses allegedly sustained by reason of such foreclosure. 7 Or it
may be that the court will follow the line of cases which, in ordinary
bankruptcy, holds the foreclosure sale as utterly void. "8 In particular, and regardless of which line of ordinary bankruptcy cases may
be followed, the doubt cast upon the title to real estate subjected to
such a foreclosure sale is of major importance. And, of course, any
deficiency claim filed by a foreclosing secured creditor who has
failed to secure prior permission of the court will be scrutinized
indeed.59

5' See text and note, supra note 54.
5
8 Supra note 53.
59 3 CoLLm, supra note 46 ff 57.20(5.3). For contrast with the pledgee
in possession situation, uncommon in Chapter XIII proceedings, see id. at I

57.20(5.1), (5.2).
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